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Resumen: El estudio del comportamiento estratégico 
dinámico en situaciones de comercio inter-
nacional con mercados imperfectos de factores 
(sindicatos) da implicaciones de política muy 
diferentes al del caso estático. Encontramos que 
al contrario de éste, el equilibrio de nuestro 
modelo es a prueba de renegociaciones; la 
implementation unilateral de subsidios puede 
tener efectos negativos en el bienestar nacional; 
y los instrumentos de política comercial no son 
útiles para reacomodar rentas. 
Abstract: The study of dynamic strategic behavior in in-
ternational trade environments with imperfect 
factor markets (unions) yields significantly dif-
ferent policy implications compared to those 
that obtain under static settings. We find that 
contrary to static equilibria, the equilibrium of 
our model exhibits renegotiation-proofness; 
unilateral implementation of cost subsidies may 
yield negative domestic welfare effects; and 
trade policy tools are not useful in pursuing 
rent-shifting objectiv es. 
1. Introduction 
Unionized labor markets are a fact of life in most modern market economics. 
Hence, increasingly broad attention has been devoted in academic and policy 
* I am grateful to John Cuddington, Dominique Desruelle, Juan Perez-Campanero, 
Yves Richelle, Pierre Lasserre and seminar participants at the 29th Annual Congress of the 
Société Canadienne de Science Economique (Mont Gabriel, Canada), Georgetown Univer-
sity and the Université du Quebec a Montreal for useful comments and discussions. 
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circles to the connection between labor market structures and international 
trade patterns, particularly in the presence of imperfect competition (also a 
characteristic feature of modern economies, Helpman and Krugman, 1989). 
This connection has not been explored in the literature except for a limited 
number of papers. Brecher (1974) and Feenstra (1980) address implications of 
labor market imperfections on international trade policy in the absence of 
imperfect competition and union bargaining power. Prior to the innovative 
paper by Brander and Spencer (1988) the literature was devoid of theoretical 
work addressing policy and positive issues within an international setting 
exhibiting imperfect competition and imperfectly competitive labor markets. 
The main predecessor to this paper is Brander and Spencer (1988). 
Brander and Spencer (1988) is a simple yet powerful one-stage (static) 
strategic model of international trade. Their model for an imperfectly com-
petitive output market may be briefly summarized as follows. The interna-
tional economy consists of two countries, each of which is populated by a firm 
and a union. There is only one input of production (labor) and technology is 
the same for both countries. Both firms produce a homogeneous good and 
compete for profits with each other in the integrated world economy where 
goods are freely tradeable but inputs are not mobile. Likewise, each firm 
individually faces a (domestic) union against which the firm bargains the 
actual wage rate paid to its workers. Equilibrium in their strategic model 
entails Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the firm-firm game and Generalized 
Nash Bargaining solution of the firm-union game in each country. 
The main results obtained in their paper include: (1) trade policies (tariffs, 
quotas, subsidies) can be used to the national advantage as rent-shifting 
mechanisms, (2) the introduction of a union in one country causes output in 
the industry to fall and reduces profit for the unionized firm. 
Ours is a multi-period strategic model of international trade with 
unionized labor markets. Labor is the only variable input used in the produc-
tion of two non-storable consumption goods. Good n is produced in a 
competitive industry in the presence of competitive labor markets, while 
good m is produced in an imperfectly competitive industry with imperfect 
labor markets. Labor is immobile internationally but mobile domestically. The 
description of the game for the good m market is as follows: Each period, firms 
and unions in each country bargain with one another over the wage rate. The 
bargaining process is assumed to evolve according to Rubinstein's (1982) 
alternating offers scheme
1. Upon agreement, firms engage in production 
activities, facing competition from rival firms abroad. Production levels deter-
mine the distribution of labor input allocations across sectors in each country. 
1 The analysis necessitated the extension of Rubinstein's model to endogenous 
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Equilibrium of the dynamic game is characterized by the following 
features: a) in the presence of international inter-union and inter-firm side 
payments, only the firm located in the country where the strongest union is 
based produces output. More interestingly, in the absence of international side 
payments, firms (across countries) alternate over time in production. Such 
non-side payments environments exhibit the highly attractive feature that the 
dynamic equilibrium is not only subgame perfect but also renegotiation-
proof,-
2 b) contrary to the static model, uniqueness of (symmetric) equilibrium 
in the dynamic model is robust to the admission of a larger class of preferences 
and technology than that studied in the literature thus far. 
Important policy implications emerge from this analysis. In particular, 
we show that, in sharp contrast with static settings, trade policies may not be 
used to the national advantage as rent-shifting mechanisms. Specifically, we 
show, for standard assumptions on international trade schemes, the non-
existence of renegotiation-proof (or the larger class of subgame perfect) 
equilibria in which trade policies are chosen as rent-shifting mechanisms. 
Likewise, we also find that unilateral implementation of labor cost subsidies 
on domestic production may yield negative effects on domestic welfare. 
The reversal of many of the results obtained in the static model arises as 
a result of the dynamic nature of the strategic interactions among firms and 
unions in the model. Formally, the incorporation of a multi-period set-up 
(specifically, as an infinite horizon game) yields as implication that the 
appropriate class of non-cooperative strategies made available to each agent 
should not be restricted to that associated with one shot Cournot-Nash 
outcomes (as preceding papers have done) but rather should also admit the 
richer class of collusive non-cooperative subgame perfect (and renegotiation-
proof) equilibrium strategies. In other words, rather than rule out cooperation 
by adopting the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium solution, we should allow 
players (firms, unions and governments) the choice of strategies yielding 
tacitly collusive payoffs. The motivations for doing so are based in the well 
known result that non-cooperative games may yield cooperative equilibrium 
outcomes. Aumann (1959,1961) proved that core outcomes are attainable as 
non-cooperative equilibrium points in repeated games. The insight behind 
this argument is well known and can be summed up as follows: if a market 
relationship is repeated ad-infinitum the members of such industry may obtain 
2 A subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile is said to be renegotiation-proof 
if for no continuation subgame, equilibrium behavior dictates pareto dominated payoffs 
to all players, in practice, the renegotiation-proofness refinement imposes the condition 
that when deviations occur the punisher can do no better by discontinuing the punis-
hment and "cooperating" again with the deviant player (Farrell and Maskin, 1989:, 
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collusive outcomes even if they are not colluding in an explicit manner. The 
enforcement of the implicit agreement to collusive actions is supported by 
losses experienced by a deviant player in the future. The losses to the deviant 
player take place through the adoption of retaliatory actions taken by the 
remaining members of the industry vis-a-vis the deviant member. 
There is a point of more general interest to note. Our results (including 
Appendix B) in effect extend Rubinstein's perfect equilibrium bargaining 
model to a class of multi-stage games with endogenous surplus size
3 (where 
surplus size is linear in the surplus shares accruing to the agents firms and 
unions). Three main hypotheses of Rubinstein's (1982) complete information 
dynamic strategic alternating offers bargaining mode! are: (1) the exogenous 
size of the pie (surplus or value) over which bargaining takes place; (2) risk 
neutrality of preferences; (3) heterogeneity of agents according to the 
negotiating order to follow {that is to say, who has the first turn in making 
offers). The equilibrium implications of the second and third hypotheses are 
as follows. It may be argued, for example, that the third hypothesis is 
equivalent to the arbitrary imposition of a first mover advantage on one of 
the players. Any such advantage, however, becomes negligible as the length 
of the bargaining round goes to zero (i.e., continuous bargaining). The im-
plications of the second hypothesis are, however, a little more subtle. If, as is 
the case in Rubinstein's model, the equilibrium strategies are pure, then a 
change in a player's risk aversion that preserves its preferences over certain 
outcomes has no effect on its opponent's payoff (Osborne, chapter 9 in Roth, 
1985a). However, changes in risk aversion as those considered in Roth (1985b) 
do not preserve a player's preferences over certain outcomes and would 
thus have non-trivial (equilibrium) implications. The results of this paper 
contribute to the analysis of multi-stage bargaining games in which dif-
ferent players interact in succeeding stages of the game yielding surplus 
size endogenous. We find that for such games the equilibrium value share 
accruing to players positioned in earlier stages is a fraction of the standard 
Rubinstein solution. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
model. Section 3 describes the static game G. Section 4 is a description of the 
dynamic game G~ . Section 5.1 solves for the equilibrium of the static game 
while section 5.2 does the same for the dynamic game G°°. Section 6 studies 
some trade policy implications for the case of government strategic behavior 
in each country. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
3 Asilis (1992) contains a formal extension of Rubinstein's model to endogenous 
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2. The Model 
The world economy consists of two domestic economies, each of which is 
populated by four types of agents: households, firms, a union and a govern-
ment. Preferences, information, production and trading technologies are 
assumed to satisfy conditions made precise below. 
2.1. Notation and Conventions 
i = Indexes countries from {1,2). 
B.= Discount factor for country i's consumers. 
Pf, PM = Discount factors (for firms and unions, respectively). 
xf, iu = Rates of time preference (for firms and unions, respectively). 
Q = (Q\ Q
2) where Q e (PpPJ. 
T= Proportional tax rate. 
n = Homogeneous, non-storab!e, tradeable consumption good produced by 
a perfectly competitive industry. 
m = Homogeneous, non-storable, tradeable consumption good produced by an 
international duopoly (one firm in each country). 
7 = l^bor input, sole variable factor in the production of both goods n and m. 
U = Per period utility function defined over n and m. 
W= Wage income per household per period. 
S = Profit income per household per period. 
P = Relative price of good m in terms of good n. 
n= Number of union members. 
Convention; Superscripts are used for country indexes (except for the 
wage rate bargaining share j?( and the consumer's discount factor P(.) and 
subscripts for time and consumption goods indexes. For example, T
l
ml denotes 
the proportional excise tax imposed by country i's government on good m 
consumption in period t. 
2.2. Household Sector 
Both economies' household sectors are assumed to be populated by a repre-
sentative household endowed with preferences over consumption streams of 
two non-storable goods m and n. Thus, the behavior of the representative 
household corresponds to the choice of sequences of functions {n\, mj) so that 
{(n , m)\ )~=0 is chosen so as to maximize the fallowing standard additively 
separable utility functional: 
y'[{(n ,m){}r-ol = £p{i
/t»{.mj) »=1,2 (1) 
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where: i) e (0 ,1), n e R+, m e R+, i/: R
2. -» R strictly increasing and 
twice continuously differentiable in both arguments and strictly concave; it) 
the constraint associated with the maximization of (1) corresponds to the 
restriction to sequences {(n , m)|}~ Q that satisfy, for a parametrically given 
sequence i(P, W, 5, Tm , Tn, Tw, Tjt}~ 0, a sequence of one period budget 
constraints to the household, namely, 
P/mj(l + r;!) + n;(l + ^,) = H'/(l-ri,) + i;(l--r4)/ i=l,2 allfeN, (2) 
where each household is assumed to offer inelastically one unit of labor each 
period. Since the focus of this paper is the effect of unionization on interna-
tional trade under the presence of an international oligopoly, both the inelas-
tic labor supply assumption and the assumption on the absence of capital 
markets for the household, implicit in (2), are made purely for analytical 
simplicity. 
Sufficient first order conditions for the household's maximization problem 
are, therefore, (2) above and 
UJn , m) P(l + TJ 
Un(n ,m)
= (1 + Tn) " 
These two conditions yield the indirect utility function for the consumer 
v(P,Tm,Tn,Tw,TK,W,n).By Roy's identity and aggregating across the two 
countries we obtain the inverse demand function for good m which we denote 
by P(m •.). 
2.3. Firms Sector 
Two non-storable consumption goods are produced in the world economy; each 
country produces both goods. Furthermore, both goods are tradeable interna-
tionally. Labor is taken to be the sole variable factor used in production and is 
assumed to be immobile internationally. Furthermore, firms are hypothesized to 
choose actions so as to maximize their discounted sum of profits. 
2.4. Market for Good N 
Production of a homogeneous good n is assumed to exhibit constant returns 
to scale (CRS) where the marginal product of labor corresponds to C > 0. The 
market structure posited to this sector is that of perfect competition. As a 
result, the wage corresponds to 
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2.5. Market for Good M 
World demand for a homogeneous good m is met by the production of two 
firms (one in each country) with access to identical production technologies. 
The incorporation of a multi-period set-up (specifically, an infinite 
horizon game) yields as implication that the appropriate class of non-coopera-
tive strategies made available to each player should not be restricted to that 
associated with one-shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcomes but should 
also admit the richer class of collusive non-cooperative subgame perfect (and 
renegotiation-proof) equilibrium strategies. 
A satisfactory description of the dynamic model must proceed, necessarily, 
in two parts. First, we need to describe the static game, and, secondly, the 
repeated game. 
3. Satic Game G 
The static game entails two phases of strategic interaction: firm-union and 
firm-firm.
4 First, a firm-union wage rate bargaining game takes place in each 
country, and secondly, a Cournot-Nash duopoly game is played internation-
ally between two profit maximizing firms (one located in each country). Only 
after an agreement between each firm and its union is arrived at do the firms 
engage in Cournot-Nash competition. 
Denoting by N the number of union members, the actions of the union 
in the wage rate bargaining game are taken so as to maximize total union 
income (taking into account the effect of their actions on employment in the 
continuation output game). Labor is mobile domestically across the n and 
m-good market sectors. Total union income is the sum of union wage income 
in the m-good industry Wm(W) and union wage income in the n-good 
industry C(N-m(W)) where, for simplicity, we assume the production tech-
nology is linear, namely, m =/(L) = L . 
Firm i's objective in the output game corresponds to the maximization 
of total profits 
[P{nt(W
l, W
2) + «-»') - w'WiW
1, W
2) 
taking parametrically the bargaining equilibrium wage rate pair (W\ W
2) 
and the output level m""' of the rival firm. 
Formally, the description of the component game G is as follows: (1) The 
period begins and each firm offers a (wage rate) amount Wfe R to the union 
4 For purposes of clarity we postpone the introduction of the government as a 
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in compensation for services to be rendered. (2) The labor union chooses an 
action from {accept, reject} in response to the wage offer made by the firm. (3) If 
the union chooses to accept then the description of the game proceeds as 
stated in (4)-{6) below; otherwise, the union makes a counteroffer of Wu to the 
firm in the next subperiod and so on until an agreement is arrived at. That is 
to say, if we define a set HQ = \j {{accept, reject) X Rf, where s indexes the 
IE N 
period's bargaining rounds, the firm's strategy is given by a mapping 
£:W0-> (accept, reject X R). Likewise, the strategy for the union corresponds 
to the mapping v : H0 -> {accept, reject XR). Thus, the alternation of offers 
and counteroffers corresponds to the bargaining scheme introduced in 
Rubinstein (1982). (4) Once an agreement is reached between the union 
and the firm, the firm chooses an amount lm e R of labor needed in 
production taking the wage rate W parametrically. Production, in order 
to take place, requires the attainment of wage rate agreement in both 
countries (so that if and when production occurs it does simultaneously 
across countries).
5 (5) The world price of good m is given by the inverse 
demand function P{m;.) where m denotes world output of good m. (6) 
Payoffs to the firms and unions obtain.
6 
The payoffs to the players are given by the following expressions: 
P{m
l + m
2 ; .)m> - W
lm
l Country l's firm 
Pirn
1 + m
2 ; >r - W
2m
2 Country 2's firm 
WW + C\N-m>) Country l's union 
W
2m
2 + C
2(N- m
2) Country 2's union (4) 
4. The Repeated Game G~(p>, f}„) 
The infinitely repeated game consists of the infinite repetition of the static 
game G together with discount factors (Pi, p?), P„ = (fi
l
u, p
2,). A complete 
description is included in Appendix A. 
5 That is to say, production is non-existent in both countries along subgames for 
which wage agreement is reached at most in one country. 
6 Note that given the deterministic nature of production, and the full-information, 
fuU-enforcement environment within which actions take place, once an agreement is 
reached between the union and the firm, moral hazard and incentive issues do not 
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5. Equilibrium 
In this section our objective is twofold. First, as a benchmark case, we compute 
the equilibrium of the static game G. Secondly, we study the equilibrium of 
the dynamic game and compare its policy implications with those arising in 
the static game. 
5.1. Game G Equilibrium 
In computing the equilibrium of the static game one first notes that the 
sequence of actions chosen by firms and unions is such that production takes 
place only after an agreement is reached between unions and their firms as 
to the wage rates VV
1 and W
2, Therefore, computation of equilibrium proceeds 
in two stages. First, for a given wage rate pair (W
l, W
2), agreed upon by the 
respective countries' unions and firms, the strategy corresponding to each 
country's m-good firm is given by the choice of m\ given an m~' chosen by its 
rival, so as to maximize %(m\ nC
i, W) = [P(m> +m
2 ; .)-W"']m''. Thus the 
solution concept used herein is that of Coumot-Nash equilibrium. The first 
order conditions for this problem correspond to the following expressions, 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, 
7t;V• = m'P + P - W
l= 0 i — 1.2 (5) 
where the second order conditions, in turn, correspond to: 
7tmW = 2I
y + m'P" < 0 i = l,2 (6) 
As in Brander and Spencer (1988) we assume that a firm's own marginal 
revenue decreases as its rival's output increases, given by the following 
condition assumed to hold globally: 
nmim-i = P' + m
iP"<0 ¿=1,2 (7) 
Furthermore, we make the assumption that the Gale-Nikaido condition, 
as expressed below, holds globally, thus ensuring uniqueness of the output 
game equilibrium. 
D = n i \ k 2 2 — 71 i m 2 i > 0 (8) 
From (5) we can express the output m' of each firm as a function of the 
wage rates W', W~\ namely, 190 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
mWonW-'') i=l,2 (9) 
Comparative static effects of changes in W
l, ¿ = 1, 2 , yield the results 
outlined below (as in Brander and Spencer, 1988): 
fit i — ^ Q 
tc -/ . 1=1,2 (10) 
Z) 
Thus, given an agreement wage rate pair (W
l, W
2) and standard assump-
tions on preferences, a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium obtains. Thus, we 
are in a position to examine the bargaining equilibrium determination of the 
wage rate agreement pair. In doing so, we must begin by spelling out 
explicitly the object (surplus, value) bargained over by firms and unions. 
The object over which the union-firm bargaining process is assumed to 
take place corresponds to the firm's gross profits Ttj. (same as revenue in this 
single variable factor setting) since that is the measure of rents generated from 
the interaction of both parties in the game. Specifically, 
dc = Plri(W',W-
,) + m-
tiW
t,W-
i)-,.W{W
i,W~') ¿=1,2 (11) 
In what follows, we denote by gi the ith firm's offer to the union it faces 
as a fraction of %[, where gi e [0, 1], ¿=1,2 (so that g^c corresponds to the 
total wage bill offered by the firm), g! denotes the fraction of gross profits 
accruing to the union when it is its turn to make a counteroffer to the firm, so 
that in a perfect equilibrium of the period t game the following conditions 
must hold
7 at every bargaining stage (or subperiod) s, (where Z denotes the 
length of the bargaining round). For the firm in each country, for ¿=1,2, 
[1 -g^t + sZ^ig^t + sZ)) 
[1 -gi'U+(s+ l)Z)]<(s/(i + (s+ 1)Z)) 
= • — fori.jeN (12) 
l+x}Z 
For the union in each country for t,se N, 
7 This is so provided that the largest and smallest equilibrium payoffe coincide (see 
e.g. Sutton, 1986). The reader may verify that the approximate linearity assumption on 
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8i\t+(s+\)Z)wc(g;{t+(s + dz» 
= max{ 
gi ( t + (s + 2) Z)]TC' (g . ( t + (s + 2) Z)) 
- — 
1+T^Z 
C)  (13) 
(12) states that in a perfect equilibrium, the ith firm is indifferent between 
making an offer in (the bargaining) period t + sZ (translating into a payoff of 
[1 -gi(i+iZ)]ji£(s(.(/ + iZ)) to itself) and waiting one bargaining period to be 
made an offer by the ith union (in period t+(s+ 1)Z) translating into a 
discounted payoff of 
to the ith firm. The unique equilibrium to the period t bargaining process is 
given by the stationary equilibrium of the system of difference equations (12) 
and (13) above. We show in Appendix B that in equilibrium the following 
holds for scalars/T,,^,... 
(1 + TuZ)[xj - KiZ-K2Z
2 - K3Z
3-...] 
g,*
= (i+< + i<
z) '
 = 1,
2
 (M
) 
Therefore, agreement is reached every period, without delay. Further-
more, as Z -> 0+ (continuous bargaining), (14) becomes 
By definition of rcj. we have that union-firm agreement is reached for 
wage rates H" = gf which correspond to the following expressions 
1 - g.'(t + l)Z)ft*c(g/(f + (j + 1)Z)) 
1+T/Z 
I= 1,2  (15) 
) P(m
l(W
x, W
2), m
2(W
l, W
2) ;.) = W
1  (16) 
(17) 
Combining (16) and (17) above, we have that equilibrium of the static 
game G is characterized by wage rates W satisfying the following propor-
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1 i *• 1 1 ' . 1.1 
í TÍ+TÍ/ 1+T.W 
(18) 
The above result is summarized in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1. The equilibrium of the static game
6 G is characterized by wage rates 
W
1 and W
2 exhibiting a proportionality relationship between them, where the 
constant of proportionality is such that W
l is greater (less) than W
2 if x
2
u/xj is 
greater (less) than x
x
u/xj, respectively. 
Thus far, we have examined the firm-union interaction within each 
country and the firm-firm Cournot-Nash output game played internationally. 
We conclude this section by determining the unique equilibrium wage rate 
pair (W\ W
2), through the restatement of the strategic behavior of each firm 
in terms of equilibrium wage rates W' imposing the equilibrium condition for 
firm-union bargaining, namely that the wage rates correspond to a fraction 
g' of the output price P. 
Formally, the problem is given by expression (19) below, for i = 1,2, 
«P(W-') = (1 -g^Plm^W
1, W^ + m-^WK W
2) ; .W(W>, W
2). (19) 
Noting that W = gP, sufficient first order conditions for this problem, 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, become 
4>w, (W-<) = /"(•)[«•) + nQ (.)W(.) - m%) + [P(.) - W> Wwi (•) = 0. (20) 
From (20) we obtain the reaction functions W\W~ ') for ¿=1,2. 
Furthermore, the following conditions are assumed to hold globally so 
as to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium 
At this stage, we summarize the previous results in the following 
proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2. The static game Ghasa unique equilibrium characterized by an 8-tuple 
(W
1*, W
2*, xl,x
2
u,x}, x
2 , mHw\ W
2), m
2(W\ W
2)) e R
2X [0, -fri: R
2 -> R)
2 
satisfying the conditions given below: 
i=l,2.  (21) 
8 Whose proof of existence and uniqueness is yet to be completed. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TRADE  193 
i) (IV
1*, W
2*) uniquely solves the pair of equations given in (20). 
H)
 =
 2(-t''+T')''
= 1'
2'
 ife-^"
<
?
 th
e
 miQ
u
e
 sub8
am
e Perfect equilibrium of 
^A^^^m^m^^2^%UMaS ^
 pr0dUCmgflrm m 
Hi) For a given wage rate pair (W\ W
2) , m
l(W\ W
2) and m
2(W\ W
2) 
uniauelv defint ithe output levels for each m sood producing industry as specified in 
eauatum(S)where the eauilibrium vair denoted above defines the eauilibrium payoffs 
to the vlaVers in the following manner 
I . J • • : • ; :  Firm ispayoff: 7c'(m<(W", W~'*) ,m~'( Wf, W~")), 
i union's payoff: W'*m-(W\ W-*) + C [N- m'(W'*, W")]. 
5.2. Game G°°$f, P„) Equilibrium 
This section studies equilibria of the full-information infinitely repeated game 
with discounting defined as the infinite repetition of the static game analyzed 
above. 
A principal objective is to establish if any policy implication of the static 
game equilibrium(to be simultaneously derived with the dynamic policy 
results) is altered in a meaningful way once one allows for dynamic strategic 
behavior. 
By far the best known class of subgame perfect non-cooperative equi-
libria of oligopolistic supergames is that supported by trigger strategies 
(Friedman, 1971). This class of games, however, is plagued by a multiplicity 
feature, oftentimes exhibiting a continuum of them. Furthermore, collusive 
subgame perfect trigger strategy equilibria do not always correspond to 
extremal equilibria yielding maximal degree of collusive behavior outcomes 
(Abreu, 1983, 1986, 1988). The reason for this latter result hinges on the 
concept of optimal punishments. In general, the Cournot-Nash reversionary 
punishment strategies supporting Friedman's trigger strategy equilibrium 
payoffs are not optimal in the sense that there may exist alternative punish-
ment profiles yielding lower payoffs to possible deviants, and thus support-
ing more collusive outcomes. 
Avoidance of extrinsic asymmetric features to the model leads us to 
restrict our attention to games associated with symmetric equilibria. As a 
result, we focus our analysis on subgame perfect symmetric
9 equilibria (and 
9 Asymmetric equilibrium extensions of the model would yield outcomes differing 
from those of symmetric equilibria only in that the players' payoff weights would no 
longer be equal (one-half each) but rather would be a function of the players' rates of 
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also renegotiation-proof equilibria) of G~. The analysis yields the desired 
features of uniqueness and optimality (i.e., maximal collusive outcomes) of 
equilibrium. In what follows, we denote by <f* the reward strategy profile 
(carrot) prescribed by tacitly collusive behavior while aP* denotes the punish-
ment strategy profile (stick) prescribed by occurrences of unilateral deviation. 
Specifically, cT entails the play of perfect joint (world) monopoly output 
levels (yielding a symmetric period payoff of 7t(m*) to each firm) while a?* 
entails the play of Cournot-Nash output levels (yielding a period payoff of 
Tcfa"') to each firm).
1
0 
Lemma 1 provides sufficient conditions to ensure that the multiplicity of 
equilibria feature of the static model resulting from the admission of a larger 
class of preferences and technology than that studied thus far does not extend 
to the dynamic case where uniqueness of optimal symmetric equilibrium 
obtains. 
LEMMA 1. Given (n(m*) ,n(a
N*)), there exists a 8* e (0,1) such that for 
8' € (8* , 1), 8'' e {$u, k}, i = 1,2, (o
c*, a?*) supports maximal collusive subgame 
perfect equilibrium payoffs 
( } 1-8' 
through reversions to Cournot-Nash play a** yielding continuation payoffs 
A'(o"*) = £ (S'^-'^^d)) = ^5 ; e N 
for a given sequence {a
N*(T)}~=, of static game G Nash equilibria (where 
a
N*(z) = o
N*for all t by results in Section 5.1.). 
Lemma 1 leads to Proposition 3. 
PROPOSITION 3. Given that: 
i) 2n(m*) corresponds to the net payoffs extracted by a "multi-plant" type 
(world) monopolist facing two, generally distinct, cost structures g' indexed by 
i'6 {1,2}; 
ii) Lemma 1 shows that for 8'e (8*, 1), ie {1,2}, the strategy profile 
(0
e*, OP*) supports maximal collusive subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in which 
each firm receives net payoffs amounting to 7t(m*), it follows that: 
1
0 From Section 5.1., rt(o
N*) is unique. 
\ 
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a) the maximal collusive subgame perfect equilibrium supported by (a**, O 
entails side payments flowing from the low g-type firm to the high g-typefirm; 
Wrti* = (m
I*,m
2*) solves 
max P(m> + m
2 ;.) (m
1 + m
2) - IV'm
1 - W
2m
2 (22) 
(m
1, m
2) 
where W
1 and W
2 correspond to the agreed upon amounts between the union and 
firm in country one and country two, respectively, determined before the employment 
decision m = (m
x , m
2) takes place. 
The solution to (22) prescribes the following taxonomy of actions: 
m* if W < W-' 
[0, m*] if W
; = W~' ( = 1,2 
0 if W
i > W~' 
where m* solves 
max P(m ; .)m - min{ W
1 , W
2}m . (23) 
The analysis leads to Propositions 4 and 5. 
PROPOSITION. If union behavior is hypothesized to follow Bertrand strategies then 
the maximal collusive subgame perfect equilibrium supported by the strategy profile 
(cT,oP*) entails period payoffs gW>(m*) to the unions, where: 
i) the union endowed with the lower reservation wage O (perhaps reflecting a 
less developed sector, region or country) captures the totality of labor services 
demanded by the m-good world industry; 
ii) the surplus or rent extracted by the low reservation wage union i corresponds 
to the difference IC
1 - C\ 
Since the structure of the game is common knowledge to all players, the 
unions know the output market game decision problem of the industry is 
prescribed by the solution to (22). A natural question to ask becomes: can both 
unions, by tacitly colluding, attain strictly preferred net payoffs to the pair 
(0 , IC
1 - C
2I m*)? If the answer to the previous question is affirmative, the 
immediate question becomes: Is the division of payoffs across unions unique-
ly determined? The next proposition addresses those two issues. 
PROPOSITION 5. If union behavior is hypothesized to admit the class of collusive 
non-cooperative strategies and P„ £ (p*,, 1), then the maximal collusive subgame 196 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
perfect equilibrium (with side payments) supported by the strategy profile (& '. cT) 
for 8' e (8*, 1) entails period payoffs
 p(
w )
m j™*!?
1. ¿1
 f
0
 i/(t, unjons ln j,of/, 
countries, where:
 2 
i)
 P(-
m ^
m
 max
W »K
2^ corresponds to the maximum symmetric (period) payoff 
supported by reversions to (0, IC
1 - C
2I m*) proved $u E "(P* , 1). 
H) Subgame perfect equilibrium prescribes tfiat only the high g-type union 
provides labor services to the industry. 
Hi) From ii), equilibrium behavior prescribes production only by the firm located 
in the country where the high g-type union resides. Consequently, such firm becomes 
a (world) monopoly. 
iv) Equilibrium behavior entails side payments amounting to one half of total 
revenues flowing from the high g-type union to the low g-type union. 
PROOF. The proof follows from a straightforward application of Lemma 1 
where: 
a) Tt(m') corresponds to £-?
(np
m" where g* = maxfg
1 , g
2}; 
b) TC(CT
v*) becomes IC
1 - C
2\m\ It is assumed here that C
1 and C
2 are such 
that IC
1 -C
2\< ^-—-"^ . As before (seeLemma 1), we restrict Q e (iT, 1) 
where Q* H max^'ia), Lf(a)), a = - IC
1 - C
2lm* and 
gV(m*)m* 
6. Trade Policy with Government Strategic Behavior 
The incorporation of government strategic behavior in each country implies 
the modification of the static game C and the dynamic game G". In particular, 
we assume: 
i) The strategy space available to governments corresponds to the class 
of proportional expenditure and income taxes, ad-valorem and specific tariffs, 
quotas and proportional cost subsidies; 
ii) The timing of the government's actions within the static game is 
taken to be the following: a) the announcement and collection of tax 
revenues take place simultaneously (across countries) and at the end of 
the period; b) the announcement of trade policies is naturally assumed to 
take place before the production activity (and the determination of the wage). A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TRADE  197 
The adjusted static game G induces, in a straightforward manner, cor-
responding redefinitions of histories and strategies in the repeated game. 
Proposition 6 demonstrates that the adoption of rent-shifting trade 
policies does not occur in the dynamic equilibrium. This result hinges on the 
fact that upon the adoption of rent-shifting policies by any one country's 
government, the countries' behavior is credibly switched to the perennial 
punishment phase (Nash behavior forever after) regardless of the trade policy 
tool used (quota or tariff). Proposition 6 shows this formally. 
PROPOSITION 6. The extended (quantity) strategy profile (<f, cs^'Y supports 
maximal collusive subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs A'io^*) = A'(0- That is 
to say, rent-shifting oriented government actions (such as, for example, tariffs and 
quotas) do not occur in equilibrium. 
PROOF. Since (&*, 0?*)« is defined as (cT, &*) plus the prescription of firm-
union reversion to &>* if their rival's government adopts rent-shifting trade 
policy tools, it follows that, for each country: 
Joint firm-
union surplus = 
P(m*)m' 8* 1-g* 
2
 li-ß;,
+ i-ß} 
if no government pursues 
rent-shifting objectives 
Òsi ^envise 
Since Tc(m') > refer*'*), the result follows.  I 
Perennial reversions to Nash equilibrium is obviously not renegotiation 
proof as these are inferior or Pareto dominated strategies from a collective 
rationality perspective. In other words, following a trade policy action by any 
one government, unions and firms may make themselves better off by letting 
"bygones be bygones" and switching to a profile different from Nash forever. 
Proposition 7 describes a simple renegotiation proof equilibrium strategy 
profile for the game. In particular, following a unilateral government devia-
tion, the strategy profile entails the one period reversion
1
1 to a profile prescrib-
ing production to be carried out only by the firm located in the country with 
the non deviant government. 
1
1 In general, reversions may be multi period depending on the relative discount 
factors of unions and firms. 198 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
PROPOSITION 7. The strategy profile 
(m
1 ,m
2) = 
(m
1 *, n~?*) at tifati-I: (m
1*, m*); or if(m*, 0) or (0, m") and 
•• m-
¡* )for i = 2 (1, respectively)  (trioni
1* andm-'
1 
att-2. 
(m*, 0) or (0 , m*) at t if aU - h m
2 and m
1 = m  «1* 
(m^m^and 
2\ respectively). 
is renegotiation proof. 
PROOF. Suppose a (unilateral) deviation takes place whereby country l's 
government adopts a trade policy tool where m
1 * m
1* while m
2 = m
2*. The 
strategy profile given above implies country l's union firm joint continuation 
discounted sum of payoffs corresponds to 
-, _ P(m*)m* g\K V-8Wf 
2 1-PJ
+ 1-P/ 
while country 2's union firm continuation discounted sum of payoffs cor-
responds to 
72 P(m')m* _ M d-^PL 
A =P(/n)m + 2 [7^2+ !_p2 1 • 
Country 1 's union and firm are made worse off by their government's actions as 
m = m 
Tt(deviating) - <
 Pv™>* [g^ + (1 - g\)ty] 
as Tt(deviating) is bounded from above by P(m*)m*. Moreover, 
2
 1 i - p2 1 - $ 
Therefore, the profile is individually rational for country 1 and country 2, 
respectively. Moreover, it is renegotiation-proof as the continuation values 
A
1 + A
2 lie on the Pareto frontier of the reduced game. • 
The (c^*, aPy profile of Proposition 6 does not admit interactions 
between the government and its union or firm. If we allow for government-A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TRADE  199 
(union or firm) interactions, Proposition 8 shows that (<f\ c?*)* continues to 
be the (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the general game. That is to say, 
PROPOSITION 8. There exists no subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile 
exhibiting government (union or firm) interactions which can credibly break the 
international non cooperative collusive behavior across countries among firms and 
unions (Proposition 6). 
PROOF. By contradiction. Suppose there in fact exists a subgame perfect 
equilibrium strategy profile exhibiting government (union or firm) interac-
tion which credibly breaks the (0
e*, C*)* profile (Proposition 6) of internatio-
nal non cooperative collusive behavior among firms and unions. The latter 
implies that once that government engages in trade policy actions, it does so 
credibly. That is to say, the local firm and/or union breaks its interaction with 
its foreign counterparts. As a result, were the government to discontinue its 
cooperation (through protective trade policy tools), the firm would face Nash 
behavior for all subséquents periods. However, when the future arrives, such 
discontinuation of cooperation is preferred by the government to continued 
tariffs or quota protection. As a result, the alternative profile is not subgame 
perfect. Contradiction. • 
Corollary 1 offers an even stronger support to the result that in equi-
librium unilateral trade policy actions do not occur. Thus, Propositions 8 and 
Corollary 1 afford theoretical basis for the current wave of international 
cooperative economic schemes. 
COROLLARY 1. There exists no renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy profile invol-
ving government-(union or firm) interactions which can credibly break the internatio-
nal non-cooperative collusive behavior among firms and unions (Proposition 7). 
PROOF. Noting that renegotiation-proofness is a refinement of subgame per-
fection, Proposition 8 delivers the result. • 
Finally, we examine the welfare implications arising from the implemen-
tation of non-negative cost subsidies to home production. The static game 
welfare objective posited to the government corresponds to that introduced 
in the previous description of the modified static game G. The reader may 
check that by assuming the existence of lump sum taxes f' and normalizing 
the social marginal utility of income to one, the differential of domestic 
welfare CD can be expressed by (where m
d denotes m-good demand) 
dcrf = - m^dP' + drt - dt
l+ d(wage income)''. (24) 200 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Since the dynamic welfare objective of the government is posited to take 
an additively separable form (standard in economic analysis), namely, 
Dto^XpyVC),] 
it follows that for stationary dynamic equilibrium 
d(D(o
i) = (T±j)duf (25) 
Thus, the sign of d(Dca>) is the same as the sign of dm'. Since M SW, it 
follows that dt^S'dmi + m'dS
1. By preceding Propositions, it follows that 
dtf + </(wage income)' < dt•' as any change in payoffs to firms and unions is 
"shared" internationally. Note that in the static game, this latter mentioned 
implication does not obtain. Moreover, as /' (lump sum) is a lower bound for 
the cost of a subsidy, we have, therefore, that diDa^/dS
1 < 0. 
The previous results are summarized in Proposition 10 below. 
PROrosiTION lO. The optimal cost subsidy in the maximal collusive subgame perfect 
equilibrium is zero. 
The above result differs rather sharply from those obtained in static 
settings, most notably Brander and Spencer (1988) where the optimal cost 
subsidy is positive. 
7. Conclusion 
The construction of a dynamic strategic model of international trade with 
unionized labor markets is shown to yield significantly different equilibrium 
outcomes and policy implications compared to those that obtain under static 
settings. 
The equilibrium of the dynamic game is characterized by the following 
features: a) in the presence of international side payments among unions and 
among firms, only the firm located in the country where the strongest union 
is based produces output. More interestingly, in the absence of international 
side payments, firms (across countries) alternate over time in production. 
Such non-side payments settings exhibit the highly attractive feature that the 
dynamic equilibrium is not only subgame perfect but is also renegotiation-
proof; b) contrary to the static model, uniqueness of (symmetric) equilibrium 
in the dynamic model is robust to the admission of a larger class of preferences 
and technology than that studied in the literature thus far. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TRADE 201 
At first reading, the features of the dynamic equilibrium (for example, 
the alternation in production in the renegotiation-proof equilibrium) would 
seem not to conform well with observed behavior. That is to say, rarely does 
one observe firms producing zero output in some periods and positive output 
levels in others. A proper reading of the equilibrium results requires the 
calibration of the model's simplifying assumptions to realistic characteristics 
of international trade. As a simplifying assumption, firms are assumed in the 
model to produce a single homogeneous product. Extending the model to 
more realistic environments in which firms enter into product lines produc-
tion activities would yield (alternating production) renegotiation-proof equi-
libria in which all firms produce in all periods (as the alternation schemes 
would apply to elements of the firms' product lines). 
Important policy implications emerge from this analysis for full informa-
tion environments. In particular, we show that, in sharp contrast with static 
environments, trade policies may not be used to the national advantage as 
rent-shifting mechanisms. Specifically, for standard assumptions on interna-
tional trade schemes, we show the non-existence of subgame perfect (and, 
consequently, of renegotiation-proof) equilibria in which trade policies are 
chosen as rent-shifting mechanisms. Likewise, we also find that unilateral 
implementation of labor cost subsidies on domestic production may yield 
negative effects on domestic welfare. 
In summary, we have constructed a dynamic full information strategic 
model of international trade yielding a unique optimal subgame perfect and 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium. In doing so we showed the significant sen-
sitivity of results obtained in models of static full information environments 
with respect to the avoidance of dynamic considerations. As a result, this 
paper suggests that full information strategic trade models are inadequate to 
study rent-shifting considerations of trade policy. Finally, the applicability of 
the framework transcends the specific issues addressed in this paper and may 
prove useful in other analyses of international policy matters in dynamic contexts. 
Appendix A 
Description of the Repeated Game G°° 
First, we describe the strategies for the firms, and, secondly, the strategies for 
the labor unions. 
Let 77' denote period rs bargaining round in which wage bargaining 
agreement is reached between country /'s union and firm. Furthermore, let 
us denote the history of actions associated with period f's bargaining game 
by a,-(a,
1, a,
2), where 202 ESTUDIOSECONOMICOS 
a{={(
1i,,(/,i).
w'/,(<,J).
w'i,(/,i + i))}i
rio ''=1.2 (A.1) 
A history to period / is therefore a sequence of actions {ar}'r=„. Let H 
denote the set of all such histories, namely, 
W=U[(R3)2(N -{-))]' (A.2) 
;e N 
A strategy If for country i's firm specifies either acceptance or rejection 
and counteroffer made to the union together with a choice of labor units, all 
as a function of the history of actions {aT)'T= Q. That is to say, 
£'://->{ accept, reject X R }X R (A.3) 
Country i's labor union also expresses its actions as a function of its 
information. Specifically, a strategy for country i's labor union is given by 
v
f: H -» {accept, reject X R} (A.4) 
A strategy profile for the game is denote by pairs (I,v) where 
I = (P, I
2) and v = (v>, v
2). Finally, we define the discounted payoffs of the 
firms and union members. Given the discount factors Pu and p., and the 
strategy profile (I, v), the ith firm's discounted sum of payoffs as of period 
/is given by 
£ (Pj)
r-' Jf'(S(r), v(D) i=l,2 (A.5) 
T=t 
Analogously, the ith union member's discounted sum of payoffs as of 
period/corresponds to 
£(pj/-'/^I(r),v(7-)) i=l,2 (A.6) 
Appendix B 
Computation of Bargaining Equilibrium
1
2 
In this appendix we derive the solution to the dynamic bargaining game 
between the firm and the union in each country. Omitting country indices for 
1
2 Asilis (1992) provides a formal analysis of the extended Rubinstein model. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TRADE 203 
simplicity, we have that equations (B.l) and (B.2) below denote the perfect 
equilibrium conditions of the bargaining game. Namely, for the firm 
[l-g]rc(s) = -£^rcQ?') (B.l) 
l+xfZ 
while, for the union, 
*W)= (B.2)  l+xuZ 
By definition of gross profits n(g) for g = g, g', we have 
K(.g) = P(m(.W(g))MW(g)) (B.3) 
dn(g) dm dP (B.4) 
dg dg
 +
m dg 
where 
dm _dm dW 
dg'dW dg 
dP dP . dm
1 dm
2 dW _ dP ? dW 
dg dm
 1 dW
1 + dW dg
 [dm
i dg" 
Since the ith union's payoff is given by WW = gPm
1, we have that 
dW' P 
dg ~ , _ dP r dm
1 dm'
1 , 
1-g : [ 7 + r 1 
dm' dW dW 
= P 
, -Pr 3P' + 2m-
iP" , 
^ 3P
, + P"(m
l + m -') 
from (10) and substituting from (5), (6) and (8). Thus, 
dW
1 P 
dg 3P' + 2m-
iP" 
g{3P
, + P"(rn
i + m-
iy 
>0 
for demand functions satisfying standard conditions of not being too concave 
(i.e., \P"\ small) or for approximately symmetric environments (as is also the 
case here, so that m' + m"' be close to 2m-'). 204 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
(B.4) can be rewritten as 
dn(g) rdm mdP^ t dP dm'
1 dW
l 
dg~ dg
1 P dm
]+
m dm dW
l dg 
dm n J_ j dP dm ' dW' 
dg
 1 n
)+
m dm dwi dg 
where the first term is negative (as dm/dg< 0 and IT)| > 1 for usual demand 
curves or appropriate bounds on the reservation wages) and the second term 
is negative (from D > 0 and dW'/dg> 0). Thus, dx(g)/dg< 0. Restricting our 
attention (for tractability) to (approximately) linear surplus functions so that 
n(g)=a + bg, a > Oandfc <0, for W~' given, enable us to reexpress(B.l) and (B2) as 
[1 -g](a + bg) = V (a + bg') (B.5) 
g
,(a + bg') = —
S—~(a + bg) (B.6) 
1+TUZ 
Moreover, it is useful to renormalize our choice of units of the good (in 
effect inducing upward or downward translations of the surplus function re) 
until the linear surplus function crosses the g axis at 1 so that rc(l) = a + b = 0 
where (B.5) and (B.6) are given therefore by (B.7) and (B.8) below 
[l-glP-^
11"/
11'^
1 (B.7) 
1 + TyZ 
g'[l*-a'] = £LLl£l (B.8) 
S
L
 S
J l+x^Z 
(B.7) implies 
(1 -g') = (l-g)(\+xfZ)
l/
2 (B-9) 
g'=\-(l-g)(\+xfZ)
1/
2 (B.10) 
Substituting (B.9) and (B.10) into (B.8) we obtain 
+ xfZ)
1/2](l -g)(l + xfZ)
l/
2 = (B.ll) 
(B.ll) becomes 
g[(l + T^ZXl + xfZ) - i] = (1 + xJZ) (1+ xfZ) - (1 + xj) (1 + xfZ)
V
2 (B.12) A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TRADE  205 
g[Z(xf+ xu + x/cJZ)] = (1 + xj)[(\ + xfZ) - (1 + xfZ)
m] (B.13) 
(B.13) can be further simplified by using the power series expansion of 
(1 + T/Z)
1/
2 which corresponds to (B.14) below 
„ -1/2 ,
 X/
Z (2
)(2~
1
} , ,
 (2
)(2~
1)(2"
2
) , , 
(1 + XfZ)
l
n = 1 + + T
2Z
2 + 3! xjz
3+ ... (B.14) 
Using (B.14) into (B.13) yields ( B.15) below (for scalars kj ,;€ N) 
XfZ 
gZ(xf+ xu + xfxjC) = (l + xuZ)[\ +xfZ- 1 -
Jzr--KXZ
2 - K2Z
3 -...] (B.15) 
xf 
gZ(xf+xu + xfx/) = (1 + xuZ)Z [-£- KlZ-K2Z
2 - K3Z
3 ...] (B.16) 
As Z -* 0
+ (continuous bargaining), (B.16) becomes 
L— (B.17) 
2(xf+ xu 
Appendix C 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The proof of Lemma 1 is simplified with the following notation: 
o
1'=(S
i
/D
!). 
a = (o"', o"
2). 
= Reward (carrot) strategy profile. 
<? = Punishment (stick) strategy profile. 
A'(o) = Discounted sum of payoffs accruing to country I'S firm under the a 
strategy profile. 
ry*
c(f) = The period / strategy which solves the problem for firm i under 
deviation. Specifically, &*
c(i) solves maxTc'(o'(0 , o -'>(/)) given all 
other agents play according to a ~
 c(t). 
7t(m*) = One half of (world) monopolist's payoffs. 
71(0"*)= (Unique) Nash equilibium payoffs of the static game. 
In what follows the condition rc(m*) > Tcio**) is used. Previous comments 
and notation leads to the following definition. 206 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
DEFINITION l. A strategy profile (o"\ a?) is said to support subgame perfect 
equilibrium payoffs \\<f, cP), ¿=1,2, if and only if the discounted net gain to firm 
i if it chooses to deviate from (o* aP) is negative. Formally, it is required that 
TC''(O-''*
c(0, o "
 c(0) - Tt'fo^CO) - 8''[A''(o<) - A'(oP)] < 0, for / = 1,2. 
PROOF. The Lemma is simple. We include the proof for completeness. By 
Definition 1, (of*, 0 must satisfy the supportability condition for ¿=1,2. 
The latter implies that for Lemma 1 to hold, the follwing inequality must be 
shown to hold for some 5 = 5* e (0,1), namely, 
TC(O<*
c*(0 , o "
 c*(0) - rc'io^M) (< S'tA'i^*) - A'(oP*)] for r e N, i= 1, 2 (C.l) 
But we know that the payoff accruing from any single period deviation is 
bounded from above by the (world) monopolist's payoffs. Namely, 
TC(O'*
c*(0 , o - «"•
 c*(r)) - 7C
I(O
C*(/)) < A<f\t)). (C.2) 
It follows, therefore, that any 5 that satisfies expression (C.3) below, must 
also satisfy (C.l). 
n'Co^W) ^ S'lAV*) - A'(o"*)]. (C.3) 
Given previous notation, (C.3) is equivalent to (C.4) below 
Jt(m*) < Mm*) ~ K(C
N*)] (C.4) 
in turn equivalent to 
7t(m*) < 5'[27t(m*) - rt(o"*)]. (C.5) 
For (C.5) to hold, we need to show the existence of a scalar 8 e (0,1) such that 
8'[27t(m*) - TC(O"*)] = 7t(m*) + e e > 0 and close to zero. (C.6) 
Defining a > 0 so that 71(0"*) = 7t(m*) - a (C.6) becomes 
8'[27c(m*) - 7t(m*) + a] = rc(m*) + e 
so that 
8'(a) = ^2±£ 
7c(m*) + a A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TRADE  207 
Since £ is arbitrarily close to zero and n(m*), a > 0, 5'(oc) e (0, 1). We take 
8* = 8*(a) = max{8
1(a))5
2(a)}. 
Since (C.5) holds for 8° if it holds for 8* where 8° > 5* the result obtains. • 
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